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P h ilosop h y

W ithout Horizon: Encountering Shpah Testimony
Director:

(65 pages)

Fred Me Glynn

This paper examines the possibilities o f encountering the Shoah
through testim ony and asks what kind o f relations w e can enter into
with it. It contrasts the power o f traditional philosophy, the power
to organize, gather, and assim ilate, with encounter and difference.
Both are relations, hut the first, a relation o f knowledge, is a power
relation, wherein alterity is subsumed and neutralized beneath the
desire for omnipresent unity. The second is a relation not of power
but o f difference, wherein alterity and difference are affirmed.
The paper argues that a deep sense o f responsibility is born out o f
encountering Shoah testim ony, and it relies heavily on the thought o f
Maurice Blanchot and Emmanuel Levinas to make this argument. In
encountering the Other, w e are bound to the Other and must answer
to and for her. W hile no response is adequate to the enormity o f the
Shoah’s destruction, a response must nevertheless be made. Thus, as
the inheritors o f a history, o f our particular history, we must respond
to the horrors o f the Shoah.
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P re fa c e
During m y first encounter with Shoah testimony, I felt an
inexpressible failure, a failure that bordered on guilt.

This sense o f

failure stemmed not only from the inadequacy o f my philosophical
ability to make sense out o f the horrible, but was rooted in the
personal encounter itself.

Each time I opened a book o f testimony I

stood in some sense accused, m y failure exposed and driven out into
the open, even though, as I said, it was an inexpressible failure.

I

felt the need to respond, and felt the equally strong frustration o f
lacking an adequate response.

The follow ing pages try to give body

to this failure, to this inexpressible sense o f accusation.
But how does one express the inexpressible?

It is a question

that permeates any study o f the Shoah, and thus, has a rightful place
in a study o f our responsibility.

One begins, I think, by questioning

the bounds o f expression, by questioning the bounds o f what is
meant by "expressing."

What is the encounter?

What is knowledge?

But our questions must push further than even these fundamental
questions.
knowledge?

Is knowledge here possible?
Is it a prelude to knowledge?

D oes encounter preclude
And so on.

many ways, this piece questions philosophy itself.

Thus, in

It questions its

ability to answer to all o f our relations, and it questions its focus on
being and knowledge as the primary aspects o f human life.
It is for these reasons that I turned to the thought o f
Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, for it seems to me that,
with Jacques Derrida and G illes D eleuze, these two philosophers have
iii

put philosophy into question in just these ways.

But even more

importantly, there is a focus on the ethical so vivid and central to
these thinkers that their very voices resonated deeply with my
(inadequately expressed) concerns about responsibility and failure.
Here, in the radical phenom enology o f these two thinkers, was a
language that, while still unable to express the inexpressible, could
delineate this sense o f responsibility and its occultation.
Thus, there are two threads to the follow ing pages.

The first

focuses on the inablity o f philosophy to answer to our relations with
testim ony and the Shoah itself.

Philosophy is power, the power to

assim ilate, to organize, and to control.

What philosophy, which is in

this sense despotic, fears is alterity, that which falls outside its
bounds.

The occultation o f responsibility arises out o f philosophical

thinking, at least philosophy as w e traditionally think o f it, because
philosophy's ability to occupy thought neutralizes any sense o f the
other and alterity.
The second thread rests on Levinas' sense o f responsibility.

For

Levinas, the encounter with the Other strips me o f my power to
assimilate, and thus, I am in a relation not o f power, as in the
know ledge relation, but o f immediacy.
me infinitely, and I must respond.

Here, the Other presides over

This notion o f responsibility

resonates deeply with the sense o f failure I feel when encountering
Shoah testim ony.

I am pow erless before the Other, before the

testim ony o f the Other, and thus am bound to the Other.
A different relation begins to reveal itself, oiie not defined by power
and assim ilation, but by difference.
iv

But many important questions remain.
about the Shoah?

What do I have to say

Indeed, what do any o f us, w e who did not

experience life in the camps or in the deadly Eastern countryside,
have to say about this singular, burning moment?

O f course, in a

sense, this piece is m y response to this question.

To remember, to

encounter, and to respond are not options, but integral parts o f our
responsibility.

And though the sense o f failure remains, probably

w ill always remain, here is a response.
Certainly not.

Is it an adequate response?

What w ould an adequate response be?

1 have not seen it m yself, but 1 have heard that behind Notre
Dame there is, buried in the ground, accessible only by a steep
staircase, an unmarked Shoah memorial.
simple.

From what 1 hear, it is very

Is this the adequate response, an unmarked memorial?

this silent symbol adequate?

Is

Since 1 have heard o f this memorial, 1

have always thought it w ould seem more appropriate to fill it in, to
bulldoze dirt and crushed cement staircase and metal handrails into
the hole, to cover and bury it.
ground.

Think o f it down there in the cold

But a terrible silence, too, is inadequate.

And we are left

only with the imperative o f a strong pessimism: through all the
inadequacy and failure, an approach must be made.
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You w ho live safe
In your warm houses.
You w ho find, returning in the evening.
Hot food and friendly faces;
Consider i f this is a man
W ho works in the mud
W ho does not know peace
Who fights for a scrap o f bread
Who dies because o f a yes or a no.
Consider i f this is a woman.
W ithout hair and without name
W ith no more strength to remember.
Her eyes empty and her womb cold
Like a frog in winter.
M editate that this came about:
I commend these words to you.
Carve them in your hearts
At home, in the street.
Going to bed, rising;
Repeat them to your children.
Or may your house fall apart.
M ay illness impede you.
M ay your children turn their faces from you.
—Primo Levi
Survival in Auschwitz^

* Primo Levi, Survival in Auschw itz, trans. by Stuart W oolf (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996) 11.
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Chapter 1

A.

Encountering the Other

The Shoah continues to make demands upon us.

Auschwitz, as

Maurice Blanchot tells us, makes a "ceaseless appeal" to us, an appeal
which cannot be satisfied, where the accounts w ill never be
balanced.2

The horrible occurred there...but the articulation o f this

horror, the coming to grips with it, is in constant elusion.

We are left

with an unanswerable obligation, an infinite duty: to respond to the
horrible, to respond to Auschwitz, the moment when the horrible
became com pulsive, when the horrible became routine.
We cite the entirety o f Primo Levi's curse because Levi here
names the demand, and not only his demand, but the demand o f
Shoah testimony.

Levi calls us to consider the Other.

"Consider if

this is a man...": consider this man here, in the mud, scraping for food.
He, too, is a man.

This woman, without hair and with a cold womb:

she, too, is a woman.

And i f you do not consider them, if you do not

turn to them, "may your house fall apart...."
Levi's curse is the demand to face the Other.

To turnourselves

toward this Other, toward the speaking o f this Other.

This pre-face,

this fore-word, is the calling-us-toward-the-word o f the Other, the
turning o f our faces toward the Other.

Levi is opening the moment o f

responsibility, m a k i n g the demand, thus his imperative tone.

2 Maurice Blanchot, “D o Not Forget,” from The Blanchot Reader, ed. and trans.
by M ichael H olland (Cam bridge, M assachusettes: B lackw ell Publishers Ltd.,
1995) 247.

2

"Consider if this is a man..."; this is a man, a human, another human
being, even here in the mud.
cannot alter our species.

As Robert Antelme says, "The SS

They are them selves enclosed within the

same h u m a n k i n d . . . . T h i s is a man: like the SS who deign to destroy
him, this one in the mud is a human being.

This one in the mud, this

man; Levi opens the first door o f responsibility.
But what is Levi calling us toward?
his telling, toward his testimony.
testimony.

Toward the telling, toward

The curse wrenches us toward his

For he asks us to consider i f this is a man, and this is,

first o f all, even before the first, even before the considering, a
calling toward the Other.

The curse is Levi making the demand o f

the Other, the demand to be e n c o u n t e r e d .

And this is why it is a

pre-face, a fore-word, for it com es before the word, before the
telling.

It calls us to turn and face the telling, this telling o f Levi's

experience o f the ultim ately horrible, which is still the experience o f
a man.

This encounter with the Other, what is it?
forem ost a demand, the demand to respond.

It, too, is first and

Levi's demand, the

demand to encounter this Other, this man, is the demand, too, to bear
witness, to bear out this telling.
what w ould this listening be?

We must listen to the Other.

But

What would this encounter be?

"The relation with the other is not...ontology," Emmanuel
Levinas tells us.^

Here we sense a radical formulation, because the

^ Robert A ntelm e, The Human Race, trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler
(Evanston: The M arlboro Press/N orthw estern, 1998) 74
Emmanuel L evinas, “Is O ntology Fundamental?,” from Basic Philosoph ical
W r it in g s , ed. by Adrian T. Peperzak, Sim on Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi,
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Other, if Levinas is correct, is not encountered in being, or at least the
encounter cannot be reduced to being.

Ontology, according to

Levinas, is the reduction o f the other to the same, the neutralization
o f alterity.

O f Heideggerian ontology, he writes, "The understanding

o f a being...consist[s] in going beyond that being into the openness [of
being] and in perceiving it upon the horizon o f being

The

comprehension o f a being, then, for Heidegger, is to understand that
being within an overall framework or horizon.

Thus, "To

comprehend is to be related to the particular that only exists through
know ledge, which is always knowledge o f the universal.
Levinas' critique o f ontology rests on the commitment o f
ontology to neutralize alterity and reduce the other to the conditions
o f the same.

In Totality a n d Infinity he writes, "The relation with

Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent
in order to comprehend or grasp it.

It is hence not a relation with

the other as such but the reduction o f the other to the same."^
O ntology does not sustain a relation with the other as other
(whatever that m ay be), but rather, neutralizes alterity in order to
comprehend the existent.

A certain econom y o f reduction is under

way in ontology, an econom y o f violence.
Thus, even comprehension, which w e might at first believe to
be Levi's desired effect in his testim ony (that we might u n d e r s t a n d ) ,
cannot be our encounter.

A s Blanchot says,"Even comprehension...is a

trans. by Sim on Critchley, Peter Atterton, and Graham Noctor (Indianapolis:
Indiana U niversity Press, 1996) 7.
5 Ibid., 5.
A ll emphases are the author’s unless otherwise indicated.
6 Ibid., 5.
^ Levinas, Totality a n d Infinity, trans. by A lphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh;
Duquesne U niversity Press, 1969) 45-6.
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grasp that gathers the diverse into a unity, identifies the different,
and brings the other back to the same through a reduction...."* To
comprehend: to bring back under the unity o f the same, to reduce
alterity in the hopes o f knowledge, etc.

No, there is an even more

fundamental encounter (we hesitate to even use the term
fundamental), which is ' the encounter with the Other.
Levi's curse, as we have said, is his fore-word, the calling-ustoward-the-word o f the Other.

It is s a y i n g in the sense Levinas gives

to the term: addressing the Other.

Saying is "the proximity o f one to

the other, the commitment o f an approach.. .

Here, the emphasis is

not on content, not on the s a i d , but on the very speaking, the saying,
itself.

This saying draws us toward the Other, commits us, as Levinas

says, to an approach to the Other.

Levi's curse is the demand to

approach this other, this man, and this place called Auschwitz.
Near the opening o f his essay "Enigma and Phenomenon,"
Levinas writes that the encounter w ith the Other is an "irreducible
disturbance," a disturbance that cannot be reduced to an order.
N evertheless, Levinas tells us, "The Other can...not appear without
renouncing his radical alterity, without entering into an o r d e r . " T o
appear is to participate in being, to enter into the openness o f being,
and thus to enter into the order o f ontology.

Thus, the Other as

phenomenon, as he appears in being, loses all alterity.

* Blanchot, The Infinite C o n ve rsa tio n , trans. by Susan Hanson (M inneapolis:
U niversity o f M innesota Press, 1993) 43
^ Levinas, “E ssence and D isinterestedness,” from Basic P h ilo so p h ic a l Writings,
ed. by Peperzak et al., trans. by A lphonso Lingis, 112.
10 Levinas, “Enigma and Phenom enon,” from Basic P h ilo so p h ic a l Writings, ed.
by Peperzak et al., trans. by Alphonso L ingis, 67.
11 Ibid., 68.
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It is on these terms, too, that w e must consider the temporality
o f this encounter.
present?

What would it mean to encounter the Other in the

It would be precisely the neutralization o f the Other, the

reduction o f alterity to the order o f the same.

To be encountered in

the present is to participate in being, in the flow o f time.

The

"irreducible disturbance," the encounter o f the Other, cannot be
reduced to the continuous flo w o f time or the participation in
ontology because it would be subordinated in both instances to
horizonal being.

Rather, it must occur in some other time, an-other

time in which the present o f the Other is nevertheless this non
present.

"[T]he past o f the Other must never have been

p r e s e n t . ” ^^

A ll o f which means that the encounter must occur in an
im m emorial past.

Intentionality, as phenom enology has envisaged it

since Brentano, is always consciousness o f something.

But this

"consciousness of" is an enclosing, encapsulating consciousness,
always participating in being and the present.

The encounter with

the Other is never encapsulated, cannot be, and thus, cannot be an
encounter within horizonal being, even if that horizon is the horizon
o f continuous time.

M oreover, this encounter cannot be experienced

by a subject as we normally think o f one, for this would be the
experiencing o f the Other in ecstatic consciousness and thus in a
present.

The encounter with the Other overwhelms subjectivity and

always occurs in an immemorial past.

Thus, as opposed to the

phenomenal, Levinas says, the way the Other has o f "manifesting
h im self without manifesting him self, w e call
12

Ib id .,

72.

13

Ib id .,

70.

e n i g m a . ” '^

7
Levi's curse, which is the demand to face this horror we call
Auschwitz, would be enigmatic in a similar way.

The curse is saying,

addressing the Other, and as Levinas says, "All speaking is an
e n i g m a . L e v i ' s fore-word is the call that demands we turn our
faces toward this other, both Levi and the Shoah, the man him self
and the place called Auschwitz.

But this saying is enigmatic, it is

preoriginal, for it calls us to face the Other anterior to, in this
immemorial past, the order o f the same.

"Being excludes all alterity.

It can leave nothing outside and cannot remain outside, cannot let
itse lf be ignored.”*^

The enigma, which would be the "irreducible

disturbance" o f Being, is the "proximity o f the Other as Other," the
approach o f the Other.

Levi's curse calls us to face this Other, it is

the aperture o f his testimony.

The opening o f the Other.

Consider if

this is a man: consider this man, this Other. ..

L evi demands that w e turn toward this Other, this testimony.
We are asked to consider, to look into the eyes o f the man in the
mud, fighting for scraps o f bread.
call toward responsibility?

This demand: what is it if not a

A demand that we respond, and more,

that w e respond for this Other?

But, as we have said earlier, the

encounter with the Other does not leave the subject in its power, its
mastery; in fact, the responsibility we have toward the Other,
revealed in the encounter, is rooted in the destitution o f the subject.

14 Ibid., 73
15 Ibid., 74.
16 Ibid., 74.
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"[T]he I," Levinas writes, "is revealed as preeminently the
same, is produced as a sojourn in the w o r l d . " T h e subject, for
Levinas, is produced through its interaction in the world.

Hence,

dw elling becom es the mode o f Levinas' conception o f subjectivity,
since in dwelling w e find the concreteness o f the same in an egoism.
"Dwelling is the very mode o f maintaining o n e s e l f ..as the body that,
on the earth exterior to it, holds i t s e l f up and

Having a home,

a site, produces identification; in the site I am provided the means to
sustain m yself.

As Heidegger, who made the term famous, says, "To

dw ell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free,
the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its
n a t u r e . A n d this takes on a special meaning for human beings:
"[HJuman being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the
sense o f the stay o f mortals on the earth.”2o

The being o f the human

is to dwell, to dwell on the earth, wherein that being is preserved.

It

is the same idea for Levinas, for in dwelling, the subject is sustained
and preserved in its subjectivity.
The power o f subjectivity, its ability to sustain itself in
dwelling, is thus an egoism .
L evinas writes.^i

"The site, a medium, affords means,"

The means for what?

o f power and mastery.

To sustain the 'I,' the subject

But, it is important to note, this subjectivity

is identification in terms o f dwelling, o f a site, and not o f total

1^ Levinas, Totality a n d Infinity, 37.
18 Ibid., 37.
19 Martin H eidegger, “B uilding D w ellin g Thinking,” from Poetry, Language,
T h o u g h t, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York; Harper & Row, 1971) 149.
20 Ibid., 149.
21 Levinas, Totality a n d Infinity, 37.

coincidence with se lf (a formal identity)

9
Which takes us to a further,

more significant, point: the same and the other are not simply
contradictory.

This kind o f formal alterity "by virtue o f the common

frontier...within the system, would yet be the same . ” 22

Formal

alterity, the alterity o f the contradiction, would be subsumed
beneath the systematic eye o f the same, and would thus be
contained.

The encounter with the Other, then, is by no means

m erely a contradiction, the encounter between mere opposites.
Rather, it is a call to responsibility.
"The epiphany o f the Absolutely Other is a face by which the
Other challenges and commands me ”23

It is in the face to face, in the

face o f the Other, that the Other is revealed.

Here there is no

reference to the horizon, but the surpassing o f all horizons.

"What,

then, is this encounter with the absolutely-other?" Jacques Derrida
a sk s.
Neither representation, nor lim itation, nor
conceptual relation to the same. The ego and
the other do not permit them selves to be
dominated or made into totalities by a
concept o f relationship. And first o f all
because the concept..., which is always g i v e n
to the other, cannot encompass the other,
cannot include the other....24
Why?

W hy is the concept unable to encompass the other?

Because

the Other remains an infinite distance from me, even in the closeness
22 Ibid., 39

23 L evinas, “Transcendence and H eight,” from B asic P h ilo so p h ic a l
ed. by Peperzak et al., trans. by Tina Chanter, Nicholas Walker, and
C ritchley, 17.
24 Jacques Derrida, “V iolen ce and M etaphysics,” from Writing and
trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1978)

Writings,
Simon
Difference,
95.
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o f the face to face.

In the bounds o f knowledge (and we here intend

the full meaning o f the term ’bounds') the Other is subordinated to
being, and thus to the same.

Within the horizon o f being, the Other is

sim ply another existent, another being, and in no way free.

But in

the closeness o f the face to face, the Other exceeds all limitations,
since to limit the Other, to subordinate the Other, would be to violate
the absolutely other .25

Thus, in the relation o f the face to face, which

is really no relation, the Other remains an infinite distance from me
because he exceeds all limitations that m y being would impose on
him.

"Face to face with the other within a glance a n d a speech which

both maintain distance and interrupt all totalities, this beingtogether as separation precedes or exceeds society, collectivity,
co m m u n ity.”26

It is this infinite distance that Levinas has in mind

when he says that our relation with the Other is one o f height.
The encounter with the Other, then, is an encounter with the
infinite, an encounter which cannot be reduced to the order of the
same.

This is the relation o f the "third kind" that Blanchot speaks of,

the non-sym metrical relation.

What founds this relation, Blanchot

writes, is "no longer proxim ity—proximity o f struggle, o f services, o f
essence, o f know ledge, or o f recognition, not even o f solitude—but
rather the s t r a n g e n e s s between us; a strangeness it w ill not suffice to
characterize as a separation or even as a distance.”22 This is the
revelation o f the face as Levinas discusses it, the horizon-less
encounter.

Indeed, Blanchot calls this relation "Man without horizon"

25 Cf. Derrida, 95
26 Ibid., 95.
2"^ Blanchot, The Infinite

C on versation , 68.
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because it is the pure encounter o f man "not affirming him self on the
basis o f a

h o r iz o n .

The pure exigency o f the face.

The e x i g e n c y o f the face.

A s w e said earlier, the face o f the

Other challenges and commands me.

H ow so?

with the Other puts me into question.

Because the encounter

"Instead o f seizing the Other

through com prehension...the I loses its hold before the absolutely
Other, before the human Other, and, unjustified, can no longer be
p o w e r f u l . T h e face o f the Other rips a breach in the totality o f the
same, puts the totality in question.

Before the absolutely other

o f subjectivity com es into

The face, the other, is

question.

the T'

that which

cannot be totalized, thus putting m y power in question.
Blanchot makes the point o f the encounter occurring without
horizon, since the horizon would only again bring the Other back
under the theme o f the same.

Derrida emphasizes this point.

"The

other...is given 'in person' and without allegory only in the face," and
further, "The face is not a metaphor, not a
is a pure encounter, without recourse.

f i g u r e .

The face to face

Here, I am in immediate

proximity to the Other, even while there exists an infinite distance
between us.

I am here stripped o f all power.
In the face, the other is given over in person
as other, that is, as that which does not reveal
itself, as that which cannot be made thematic.
I could not possibly speak o f the Other, make
o f the Other a theme, pronounce the Other as
object, in the accusative. I can only, I m u s t
only speak to the other; that is, I must call

28 Ibid., 69.
29 L evinas, “Transcendence and H eight,”
30 Derrida, 100-01.

17.
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him in the vocative, which is not a category, a
case o f speech, but, rather the bursting forth,
the very raising up o f speech
Always
behind its signs and its works, always within
its secret interior, and forever discreet,
interrupting all historical totalities through its
freedom o f speech, the face is not "of this
world." It is the origin o f the world. 1 can
speak o f it only by speaking to it.....
The face cannot be thematized, cannot be woven into the totality o f
the same without thereby neutralizing alterity.
as Derrida says, 1 must speak to it.
It demands my speaking to it.

Hence, to speak o f it,

The face calls me out to respond.

A s Blanchot says, "Speech affirms the

abyss that there is between 'm yself and 'autrui,' and it passes over
the im passable, but without abolishing or reducing it.”32 To speak to
the Other is to approach the Other without neutralizing him.
It is thus, from the infinite height o f the Other, that the face
commands and challenges me.
rather commands a response.

It in no way signifies anything, but
It is thus that Blanchot w ill say, "man

facing man... has no choice but to speak or to kill.”33

I cannot face the

Other and not respond, whether that response be murder, since
murder is but the hate o f the demand the face makes upon me, the
violence o f the same in its breached totality, unwilling to sacrifice
itself for the Other.

Speech, saying, the engimatic, nonphenomenal,

unrepresentable, and thus, alw ays immemorial, approach that
nevertheless is both close and infinitely distant, is the authentic

31 Ibid., 103.
32 Blanchot, The
33 Ibid., 61.

Infinite

C on versation , 63
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response.
im p ossib le

B.

The encounter with the Other occurs in this dangerous,
landscape.

W elcom ing the Other. Jewish humanism

Blanchot has sought in Judaism the affirmation o f exile and
nomadism, the affirmation o f distance and proximity.

Considered a

negative condition, even an affliction, by many, Blanchot sees in
Judaism the "foundation o f our relationship to others"—a
fundam entally ethical conception.34

Nomadism, a perpetual

relationship with exteriority, with alterity and the Other, becomes
the basis for ethics.

In Judaism Blanchot finds an other humanism.

Blanchot contrasts Jewish nomadism with paganism.

"To be

pagan," he tells us, "is to be fixed, to plant oneself in the earth, as it
were, to establish on eself through a pact with the permanence that
authorizes sojourn and is certified by the certainty in the land.’’^^
Paganism, riveted to a site, is ultimately power, for it is the site
where the pagan dwells, that, as both Heidegger and Levinas tell us,
preserves the freedom o f the human being and provides him with
m ea n s.36

Paganism is rooted in power and thus allows subjectivity to

flou rish .
Nom adism , on the other hand, "answers to a relation that
possession cannot satisfy."^?

Where paganism is rooted to the site.

3'* Blanchot, “Do Not Forget,” 245.
35 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” from The
Holland, trans. by Susan Hanson, 230
36 Cf. the preceding section.
3^ B lanchot, “The Indestructible,” 230.
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the site o f power and possibility, nomadism answers to a different
relation, a relation o f difference.

Nomadism is a relation with exile

and exodus, w ith leaving the homeland, with never having a proper
homeland.

"To leave the homeland, yes; to come and go in such a

way as to affirm the world as a passage....

The words exodus and

exile indicate a positive relation with exteriority, whose exigency
invites us not to be content with what is proper to us.”^* What is
proper to us in this sense?

Paganism, ”[0]ur power to assimilate

everything, to identify everything, to bring everything back to our
I.”39

Nomadism, on the other hand, is the affirmation o f the

exteriority o f the world, o f exteriority itself.'*®

38 Ibid., 232.
39 Ibid., 232.
An interesting connection to the work o f G illes D eleuze has done on
N ietzsch e’s thought reveals its e lf here in B lanchot’s discussion o f nomadism.
For D eleuze, N ietzsche has opened a new political possibility, and that
possib ility is essen tially nom adic.
He w rites, “Philosophic discourse is born
out o f the im perial state, and it passes through innumerable metamorphoses,
the same m etam orphoses that lead us from the foundations o f empire to the
Greek city.
Even w ithin the Greek city-state, philosophic discourse remained
in strict relation with the despot (or at least within the shadow o f despotism ),
with imperialism ... But i f N ietzsche
does not belong to philosophy, it is
perhaps because he w as the first to conceive o f another kind o f discourse as
counter-philosophy.
This discourse is above all nomadic [and] its
statem ents...[are] not the utterances o f a rational, adm inistrative machinery,
w hose philosophers w ould be bureaucrats o f pure reason...”
A thought from
the Outside, as Blanchot might put it. The break with totality, for both Deleuze
and Blanchot, is nom adic.
But the comparison runs deeper, for both thinkers
see in this break a kind o f politics o f the Outside. D eleuze writes, “We also
know that the problem for revolutionaries today is to unite within the purpose
o f the particular struggle w ithout falling into the despotic and bureaucratic
organization o f the party or state apparatus.
W e seek ...a nomadic unit related
to the outside that w ill not revive an internal despotic unity.” Nomadism as the
perpetual break with totalities.
And Blanchot w rites, “ [AJffirm the break ...
The break with the powers that be,hence with the notion o f power, hence
everywhere that power predom inates.” Nom adism as the root o f a politics o f
the outside, a politics that does not reconstruct itse lf as a state apparatus, but,
rather, always fires at despotism from the outside, always de-constructs itself.
A discussion o f nom adism should not overlook this kind o f political possibility.
Cf. G illes D eleuze, “Nomad Thought,” from The New Nietzsche, ed. and trans. by

15
Nomadism thus puts the site in question; it always refers to a
beyond.

"Exodus and exile," Blanchot tells us, "express simply the

same reference to the Outside that the word existence bears.
Beyond being, outside being: existence is the ecstasy o f existence.
"[I]f to become rooted in a culture and in a regard for things does not
suffice," Blanchot propbses:
it is because the order o f the realities in
which we becom e rooted does not hold the
key to all the relations to which we must
respond. [In opposition to the pagan order o f
things and truth], there is another dimension
revealed to man where, beyond every
horizon, he must relate to what is beyond his
reach. 42
Nomadism is the putting into question o f the pagan site, and thus
opens us to another dimension.

But this dimension is "beyond every

horizon," that is, it occurs within no horizon.
that exceed the pagan horizon?

What are these relations

They are our relations with others.

For Blanchot, being Jewish means much more than the negative
conditions o f suffering and persecution.

It is an "exigency o f

strangeness," the demand to bear out the stranger.43

As Edmond

Jabes says, "Jewish solidarity is the im possible passion one stranger
can feel for another.”44

The Jew has always been the stranger, the

David B. A llison (Cambridge, M assachusettes: The MIT Press, 1985), and
B lanchot, “D isorderly W ords,” from The Blanchot R eader, ed. and trans. by
M ichael H olland (Cambridge, M assachusettes: B lackw ell Publishers Ltd., 1995).
41 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 232.
42 Ibid., 232-3.
43 Ibid., 234.
44 Edmond Jabes, The Book o f Yukel, trans. by Rosmarie Waldrop (M iddletown,
Connecticut: W esleyan U niversity Press, 1985) 32.
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nomad, and thus it should be no surprise that Blanchot finds the Jew
to be the aperture to this relation.

The other humanism Blanchot

proposes rests on the encounter with the Other, the encounter that
Jewish nomadism and being Jewish opens.
What, Blanchot asks, is the gift o f Israel?
one God.

The teaching o f the

But this is not the heart o f what Judaism has taught,

Blanchot says.

Rather, he responds, "[W]hat we owe to Jewish

monotheism is not the revelation o f the one God, but the revelation
o f speech as the place where men hold them selves in relation with
what excludes all relation: the Infinitely Distant, the absolutely
Foreign.

God speaks, and man speaks to him.”'^^ For Blanchot, the

heart o f this humanism, o f this Jewish humanism (as opposed to
Greek or pagan humanism), is speech as the impossible relation.

The

im possible relation because it brings us into relation with what is
infinitely distant, which "excludes all relation."'*^

The communion

with God, and ultimately, the community o f Jews, is sustained in
speech, which does not reduce distance but rather sustains it while
nevertheless bringing us into relations.
"Distance," Blanchot tells us, "is not abolished, it is not even
diminished; on the contrary, it is maintained, preserved in its purity
by the rigour o f the speech that upholds the absoluteness o f
d i f f e r e n c e . "47

Speech is the mode o f proximity, that is, in speech,

what is proximal is preserved in its distance without being
appropriated or assimilated.

It is addressing what is different

45 B lanchot, “The Indestructible,” 233.
46 Ibid., 233
47 Ibid., 233.

w ithout reducing that difference.
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Speech and address are preserves

o f distance.
Let us acknowledge that Jewish thought does
not know, or refuses, mediation and speech as
mediating. But its importance is precisely in
teaching us that speaking inaugurates an
original relation in which the terms involved
do not have to atone for this relation or
disavow them selves in favour o f a measure
supposed to be common; they rather ask and
are accorded reception precisely by reason o f
that which they do not have in common.^»
In speaking, the Other is preserved and not reduced to a totality.
The address addresses the Other, it is not a speech o f power but a
mode o f address, o f calling toward.

"To speak to someone is to accept

not introducing him into the system o f things or o f beings to be
known," Blanchot says.

Rather, "[l]t is to recognize him as unknown

and to receive him as foreign without obliging him to break with his
d iffe r e n c e .”49

Thus, even this preservation is poorly named if we

assume by it a measure o f power in the addressee; it is not the
power o f preservation, but the w e l c o m i n g o f the Other in all his
o th e r n e s s.
Thus, nomadism and speech would be a kind o f welcom ing and
receiving.

Speech welcom es the Other in all his otherness, and

nom adism affirms this relation with exteriority.

When Levinas tells

us that our relation with the Other is one o f height, o f infinite
distance, Blanchot reads this, correctly, as a relation with the infinite,
and speech sustains this relation.
48 Ibid., 233
49 Ibid., 233.

The Other (is) an enigma in
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Levinas' sense
ontology.

o f the term, that is, the Other disrupts

As

being and

such, the Other is infinitely distant from

with this infinite distance that I
Blanchot, has

me, and

itis

am now in relation. Judaism, for

always recognized this infinity, has always been in this

relation because o f its monotheism.

Nomadism, thus, is the

affirmation o f this relation, and speech is its landscape.

"Speech,"

Blanchot tells us, "is the promised land where exile fulfills itself in
sojourn since it is not a matter o f being at home there but o f being
always Outside, engaged in a movement wherein the Foreign offers
itself, yet without disavow ing itself.
Thus, Blanchot proposes a "Jewish humanism," which is to be
distinguished from Greek humanism "by a concern with human
relations so preponderant that, even when God is nom inally present,
it is still a question o f man; o f what there is between man and man
when nothing brings them together or separates them but
th e m s e lv e s .”5*

The God o f Israel, the monotheism o f the Jews, opens

onto the distance between human beings, but in such a fashion as to
w elcom e what is distant, to w elcom e the Other in his destitution and
destruction.

Greek humanism, the humanism o f ontology, neutralizes

alterity, and thus the Other is never welcom e unless cloaked and
reduced to the order o f the same.

But in Jewish humanism the Other

is w elcom ed in his otherness, addressed in speech, affirmed in his
difference.

It is thus that Blanchot says:
Jews are not different from other men in the
way racism w ould have us believe; they

50 Ibid., 233.
51 Ibid., 233-4,

19
rather bear witness, as Levinas says, to this
relation w ith difference that the human
face...reveals to us and entrusts to our
responsibility; not strangers, but recalling us
to the exigency o f strangeness; not separated
by an incom prehensible retribution, but
designating as pure separation and as pure
relation what, from man to man, exceeds
human pow er—w hich is nonetheless capable
o f anything.52
And as Edmond Jabes says, "The salvation o f the Jewish people lies in
severance, in solidarity at the heart o f

s e v e r a n c e . "53

Levi's curse opens this aperture, demands that it be faced, that
we take our place and assume our responsibility.

To face the Shoah,

to approach the suffering o f Others, to enter into this community
bound by nomadism: these are Levi's demands.

Nomadism means to

leave behind what w e know and possess, to forget the land where it
is safe and warm and to turn toward the exterior, toward what is
other.

Levi's curse calls us to face the horror, to look at this man

fighting for scraps, and to recognize that w e are bound to him.

52 Ibid., 234.
53 Edmond Jabes, The Book o f Q uestions, trans. by Rosmarie Waldrop
(M iddletow n, Connecticut: W esleyan U niversity Press, 1972) 100.

Chapter 2

A.

Event without horizon

L evi’s curse calls us to face his testimony, to face the
destruction o f human beings at Auschwitz.

It is the fore-word, in the

preoriginal sense Levinas gives to the term, becuase it calls us
toward the word o f the Other.

Levi's demand is the demand to

encounter the other, to encounter the horrible, to encounter
Auschwitz.
curse.

The ceaseless appeal o f Auschwitz is realized in the

It draws us into the im possible proximity o f one to the other.
This proximity, as we have seen in Levinas' study o f the face to

face, is an ab-solute encounter, since it occurs anterior to any horizon
and without mediation: it is pure encounter.
sense o f non-solubility.

It is absolute in the

Thus, when Blanchot tells us that the Shoah

is "the absolute event o f history," he has this meaning in mind: the
Shoah is not soluble, is not

re d u c ib le .

^4

Auschwitz cannot be reduced

to a sensible moment on a familiar continuum, calculable, say, in a
causal series.

It is itse lf the horizon, which is subordinated to no

other.
This theme recurs in Shoah testim ony.

Inmates found

them selves unable to transcend their reality toward some other.

The

entire horizon becam e day-to-day survival, and envisioning life
beyond it became im possible.
impenetrable wall.

The reality o f the camp was total, an

Certainly, there was the hope o f freedom, of

54 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isa ster, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln,
Nebraska: U niversity o f Nebraska Press, 1995) 47.
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liberation and a return to hom es

and families, but in no way did

these hopes sustain the inmates.And further, these

hopes most

often took the form o f desires felt most intensely within the camp.
H ence, inmates relate that they dreamed almost nightly
m eals and warm baths,

even cigarettes and coffee.

o f large

But for the

majority o f the inmates; what Levi calls the "backbone o f the camp,"
there w as nothing beyond immediate hunger and pain.
[T]hey, the M uselmanner, the drowned...an
anonymous m ass, continually renewed and
always identical, o f non-men who march and
labour in silence, the divine spark dead
within them, already too empty to really
suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one
hesitates to call their death death, in the face
o f which they have no fear, as they are too
tired to understand.^^
The drowned, as Levi calls them, are unable to fear even their own
death; for them there is only the immediacy o f existence: hunger,
pain, affliction.
Jean Amery, though in no w ay a Muselmann, nevertheless
relates a similar experience.

Returning from work one evening,

Amery's attention is caught by a flag waving in the wind in front o f a
building.

‘“ The walls stand speechless and cold, the flags clank in the

w ind,’ I muttered to m y self in mechanical association,” Amery
w r ite s .

56

Amery remembers how the stanza used to affect him.
Then I repeated the stanza somewhat louder,
listened to the words sound, tried to track the

56 Levi, S u rvival in A u sch w itz, 90.
56 Jean Amery, “At the M ind’s Lim its,” from At the M in d ’s Lim its, trans; by
Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. R osenfeld (New York: Schocken Books, 1986) 7
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rhythm, and expected that the emotional and
mental response that for years this Holderlin
poem had awakened in me would emerge.
But nothing happened. The poem no longer
transcended reality. There it was and all that
remained was objective statement: such and
such, and the Kapo roars "left," and the soup
was watery, and the flags are clanking in the
wind.57
For Amery, there is no longer a transcendence in the line, only the
the camp itself.

Yes, the flag clanks in the wind, here, in Auschwitz.

It does not lift him beyond the w alls o f the camp, but somehow is
exhausted in the camp itself.
Auschw itz became, in this sense, a kind o f unsurpassable
horizon.

It was not merely a place, but a world, and a totalized world

at that.

The Holderlin line is deflated completely in the camp.

Charlotte Delbo, too, discusses this point.

She writes, "When I would

recite a poem [Delbo was known in the camp for her literary
background, and much loved because o f it], when I would tell the
comrades beside me what a novel or a play was about while we went
on digging in the muck o f the swamp, it was to keep m yself alive ...to
remain me, to make sure o f it.

Never did that succeed in nullifying

the moment I was living through, not for an instant.”^» Here, as for
Amery, there is no aesthetic transcendence, not even momentary
conciliation.

"Reality was right there, killing.

getting away from it.”^^

There was no possible

These moments are what we might call

57 Ibid., 7.
5* Charlotte Delbo, D ays an d M em ory, trans. by Rosette Lamont (Marlboro,
Vermont; The Marlboro Press, 1990) 2.
59 Ibid., 2.
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anarchie, since they neither stem from the reality they arise in nor
do they dissolve into it; they arise as moments o f an-archic defiance.
D elbo asks herself i f she is "living with Auschwitz?"
responds, "No, I live next to it.
precise...."^0

Auschwitz is there, unalterable,

"I live within a twofold being.

doesn't bother m e....

She

The Auschwitz double

As though it weren't I at all.

Without this split

I would not have been able to r e v i v e . F o r Delbo, her being has
been split in two so that she might return to so-called "ordinary" life.
But, as she says, Auschwitz remains, it is "there, unalterable, precise."
It remains totally isolated from the rest o f her life, a horizon so
impenetrable that she had to split in order to continue on.
It is thus that Auschwitz was its own horizon.

The event

A uschw itz, the Shoah, as for these survivors, remains an
impenetrable w all, indissoluble.
memory.

The experience remains hard, in

To have lived through the camps, for Delbo, meant the

necessity to split into two different beings.

It was impossible to

place the event within another horizon; to do so would be to
subordinate the ultimate to the everyday, to the common.

And this

tendency is a constant struggle in testimony, a struggle against the
audience's tendency to reduce, to identify, and to accept.
In her first memoir o f the camps. None o f Us Will Return, Delbo
attempts to confine this trend by addressing the audience outright.
While narrating aspects o f life in the camps, she also explores the
limits o f the reader's ability to understand, even to hear, her words.
A dangerous fault line opens between narrative and knowledge,
60 Ibid., 2.
61 Ibid., 3.
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between words and understanding; a space begins to develop which
the reader both occupies and cannot occupy.
"O you who know," Delbo writes, "did you

k n o w ..

. . ” ^2

q you who

know, O reader who know s...w ho thinks he knows...who thinks it is
possible to know: these are Delbo's accusations, cloaked as questions.
O f course, we do not know.

The knowledge Delbo possesses, useless

knowledge, as she calls it, is an immediate knowledge, a burning or a
scarring, not textbook knowledge.

"O you who know" means nothing

more than you don't know, couldn't possibly know.

And yet she asks

us to know, to attempt to understand.
Delbo strives in her narrative to exteriorize the knowledge she
is communicating.

Writing in vignettes, as so many survivors do,

D elbo often punctuates and interrupts her narratives by somehow
disrupting the reader.

At one point in her memoir she relates the

story o f a woman who, driven by thirst, breaks ranks and runs for
water.

Delbo, paradoxically, weaves a beautiful prose poem that

roams over the "white plain" while still relating the terrifying events
leading to the woman's death.

Near the middle o f the vignette,

how ever, Delbo abruptly interrupts her narrative to tell us
"Presently I am writing this story in a cafe—it is turning into a
s t o r y . ” ^3

Delbo exteriorizes the narrative by temporally displacing

both herself, as

narrator, and the reader: we are suddenly pulled out

o f the text and into a Parisian cafe

The first person plural, the most

common voice in Shoah memoirs, suddenly flees beyond the horizon.

Charlotte D elbo, None o f Us W ill Return, from A u sch w itz an d After, trans. by
Rosette C Lamont (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 11.
63 Ibid., 26.

'We' is ever so far over there.
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She ends the vignette by writing, "And

now I am sitting in a cafe, writing this text.”^"*
The m ost profound example o f this exteriorization, though,
comes late in the text.
die.

W hile digging one day, two o f Delbo's friends

After carrying the bodies back to the camp, the women stand at

roll call.
corpse.

"Throughout the roll call, w e never looked at them.
The left eye devoured by a rat.

fringe o f lashes."

A

The other open with its

But here she pauses, and then writes, "Try to look.

Just try and see.”^^

She addresses the reader explicitly, challenging

the reader to "try to see "

The event that she has just narrated she

now banishes from the reader: you cannot see this, you cannot
understand this.

She openly questions the ability o f the reader to

grasp this event.

In her challenge lies the exteriorization o f the

event, it puts the entire narrative in question.

Delbo works to

maintain the singularity o f the event by exteriorizing her narrations
with regard to the reader.
it cannot be understood.
revealing the

She tells her story and then declares that
W hile narrating her experiences, she is also

problem atics o f testim ony and bearing witness,

attempting to open a space in which the reader might, rather than
attempting to integrate the Shoah into historical consciousness,
recognize this new catastrophe.

It is as i f Delbo's real subject is not

her experience o f life in Auschwitz but, rather, the question o f
bearing w itness to that experience.
Delbo recognizes a central problem in testimony: while the
event, for the survivor, remains a singular one (it is a horizon unto
64 Ibid., 29
65 Ibid., 84
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itself), the audience im m ediately contextualizes and appropriates the
testim ony, drawing inferences and conclusions.
reduced, placed within a horizon, mediated.

The irreducible is

But this is not an act o f

aggression on the part o f the audience, that is to say, the audience is
here not to be held strictly accountable for this p h e n o m e n o n .

And

this is precisely the point, the t e s t i f y i n g becomes t es tim o n y , becom es
phenomenal.

A s Levinas says, the "subordination o f the saying to the

said, to the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that
m anifestation

d e m a n d s . T h a t for every speaking there is a said, a

content, is the price for that speaking.

It manifests itself, and as

such, is reduced to the order o f the same

"In language qua said,

everything is translated before us, be it at the price o f a betrayal.”®^
This betrayal is Delbo's theme, w e may even say, nemesis,
through much o f her writing.

The attempt to exteriorize her

narratives is an attempt to fend o ff this betrayal.

The reader is left

with testim ony with which in no way is he or she comfortable, even
beyond the sheer horror o f the content.

The position o f the reader is

complicated, thematized and put into question.

It stands and falls on

the approach to the work, on the w holeness o f the work and the
work’s "unto itself-ness."

Thus, w e come back to Blanchot's complicated phrase, "the
h o l o c a u s t —the absolute event o f his tory. . . . The Shoah, this
horizon-less event, nevertheless occurs within history, the totalizing

L evinas, “Essence and D isinterestedness,”
67 Ibid., 112.
68 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isa ster, 47.

112.

horizon.
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We thus have histories, studies, graphs, figures, statistics: all

to relate the im m ensity o f the destruction, how it took place, who
perpetrated it, and its roots in past historical trends.

And all, also, to

place the event within larger contexts, to provide horizons o f
m eaning in order to understand

But survivors continually struggle

against this contextualizing, against any subordination o f the Shoah
to a theme.

As Lawrence L. Langer notes, survivors often feel their

descriptions o f life in the camps are "totally inadequate" and cannot
"convey the enormity o f the event.”^^ Here, as Delbo knows, there is
a sense o f betrayal.
But this betrayal is the price o f the Shoah's phenomenality.
occurred: this fact returns again and again.

It

The Shoah was a moment

in history, and yet it is the encounter with the ultimate, the singular.
I f God, as Levinas says, cannot be encountered within the world, the
Shoah would be the opposite.

Total affliction, immediate pain, living

hunger: the creation o f the society o f the Musselmanner, a society
without horizon, living in the non-present presence o f pain and
hunger.

Ab-solute: referring to no horizon, irreducible.

It is thus that bearing witness has come to signify Shoah
testim ony.

The inscription over the entrance to the United States

Holocaust Memorial Museum, in the words o f Elie W iesel, reads, "For
the the dead a n d the living, w e must bear witness."

The survivor

feels a responsibility to be heard, to tell what happened.

To tell the

story, as if nothing else could be done, no explaining and no
balancing o f the accounts.
Lawrence L. Langer, H o lo c a u s t
Press, 1991) 61.

T estim on ies (New Haven: Yale University
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B. Suffering

The Shoah is an event without horizon.

The words o f Jean

Amery and Charlotte Delbo, and the society o f the Muselmanner,
testify to this.

The inability to transcend, to overcome, the camp, the

hunger, the pain, all indicate that the universe o f the camp was one
unto itself, a domain that was self-enclosed.

Marked by a burning

immediacy, the suffering at the heart o f the Shoah nullified all
horizon s.
Horizons are the source o f continuity.

Phenomenology has

always understood this, that is, has always understood that any
understanding occurs against the horizon.

Indeed, w e can make a

plea to the German language to make this point clear.

'Object,' in

German, is 'gegenstand,' literally, to 'stand against.'

Thus, an object is

always understood a g a i n s t the horizon beyond it.

As Heidegger says,

"A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks
recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its
presencing.

That is why the concept is that o f h o r i s m o s , that is, the

horizon...."^0

It is only against the horizon that presence is

en co u n tered .
But this recognizing o f presence is a mode o f power.

Levinas

writes; "An existent is comprehended in the measure that thought
transcends it, measuring it against the horizon whereupon it is
p r o f i l e d . T h e horizon, the against-which, allows for the
comprehension, the apprehension, o f the existent.
H eidegger, “B uilding D w ellin g T hinking,”
Levinas, T o ta lity a n d Infinity, 44.
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It affords a

m edium wherein the thing can be comprehended.
allow s for power.
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Thus, the horizon

It allow s the comprehension o f the thing, the

existent, because it determines the parameters o f the encounter.
W hen Levinas says (with H eidegger), "Being is inseparable from the
comprehension o f Being," he im plies this relation o f

p o w e r

.^2

The

existent is neutralized in the encounter, and the horizon allows for
this neutralization.

Thus, the horizon, for Heideggerian

phenom enology, works to contextualize the existent.
"Suffering," Blanchot writes:
is suffering when one can no longer suffer it,
and when, because o f this non-power, one
cannot cease suffering it. A singular situation.
Time is as though arrested, merged with its
interval. There, the present is without end,
separated from every other present by an
inexhaustible and empty infinite, the very
infinite o f suffering, and thus dispossessed o f
any future; a present without end and yet
im possible as a present^]
This suffering occurs without horizon.

In torture, the victim's

suffering is measured, gauged, in order to keep the victim there, that
is, in order to m a i n t a i n the victim t h r o u g h the suffering so that
information might be forced out o f him.

Torture is thus a suffering

which occurs within a horizon: a measured, calculated suffering.

But

the suffering Blanchot describes has already passed over into
another time.

It is the suffering o f the Muselmanner, the drowned,

the anonymous mass that forms the "backbone o f the camp."
annihilated: the Muselmanner are this suffering.
72 Ibid., 45.
73 Blanchot, The

Infinite

C o n ve rsa tio n , 44.

Broken,

As Levi says, "One
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hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their death
d e a t h . . . . "74

They are stripped o f all identity and power, even the

power to suffer, to u n d e r g o their suffering.
"The present o f suffering," Blanchot tells us, "is the abyss of the
present, indefinitely hollow ed out and in this hollow ing indefinitely
distended, radically alien to the possibility that one might be present
to it through the mastery o f

p r e s e n c e . ” 75

In suffering, the present o f

suffering nullifies any horizon.

Indeed, if the horizon is the source o f

power, against which one can

cornprehend, then the present o f

suffering has no such horizon.

The Muselmanner, unable to

appropriate their suffering as their own, slip into anonymity.
Stripped o f their identity, stripped by suffering, they are turned over
to another tim e, this present without presence, a present without
horizon, wherein there is only suffering.

When Levi says that the

Muselmanner "are already too empty to really suffer," Blanchot
would agree.76

He writes, suffering "is a question not o f that

paroxysmic state where the se lf cries out and is torn apart, but
rather o f a suffering that is almost indifferent, not suffered, but
neutral (a phantom o f suffering) insofar as the one who is exposed to
it, precisely through this suffering, is deprived o f the T that would
make him suffer it [my

e m p h a s e s ].

”77

It is the suffering through

which the self, subjectivity, etc., cannot be sustained.

74
75
76
77

Levi, S u rvival in A u sch w itz, 90.
Blanchot, The Infinite C o n versa tio n , 44.
Levi, S u rvival in A u sch w itz, 90.
Blanchot, The Infinite C o n versa tio n , 44-5.
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trial o f experience, but rather that trial from which we can no longer
esca p e.”'^*
This suffering cannot be escaped.
strangeness, o f alterity.

It is the experience o f

The horizon provides distance, a

background, against which w e can comprehend the existent.

In

horrified fascination the existent overwhelm s the subject and the
horizon.

But in suffering, the horizon is nullified not by an existent,

but rather through the experience from which no distance can be
taken.

The horizon, for subjectivity, would allow some distance

wherein the appropriation o f suffering could occur, but here "it is so
close that w e are prohibited from taking any distance from it—it is
foreign in its very proxim ity.”'^^ As Blanchot says, we have a word
for this, a word that designates this proximity; immediacy.

”[T]he

immediate that allow s no m ediation, the absence o f separation that is
absence o f relation as w ell as infinite separation because this
separation does not reserve for us the distance and the future we
need in order to be able to relate ourselves to it, to come about in
it.”8°

This suffering is burning immediacy.
In nullifying the horizon, suffering, the suffering o f the

Muselmanner (but also the suffering that is, in an important sense,
the Shoah) disrupts all contextualization and continuity.

As Blanchot

says, suffering takes away our ability to relate to ourselves through
the future, thus cutting o ff any sense o f continuity.

Suffering occurs

within a non-present present, the present o f proximity to the

78 Ibid., 45
79 Ibid., 45.
80 Ibid., 45.
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strange, and thus can never be fully recuperated or brought back
into a continuum that would make sense o f it all.

It is an

immemorial past, a disturbance in the order o f things.

It is pure in

its im m ediacy.
Thus, when Blanchot says, "He who has been the contemporary
o f the camps is forever a survivor: death w ill not make him die," we
must recognize the interminability o f the Shoah.^'

For survivors,

even (for Blanchot) for contemporaries o f the camps, the mode o f
surviving is not one that can be overcome.
transcended.

This suffering cannot be

It can be broken, much like a trance can be broken, but

it cannot be appropriated.

It is suffering without end, an

interminable presence, a presence, as he says, that is distended.

This

suffering cannot be overcome by power, cannot be contextualized or
wrought to fit into a continuum.

It persists, like the il y a, always

working and un-working beneath projects, always nullifying the
horizon.
The Shoah continues to destroy.
persists.

We must learn this.

Its horror

To date the end o f the destruction with the "liberation" o f

the camps is foolish and assuming.

In an effort to combat this false

conclusion, Levi writes:
In the majority o f the cases, the hour of
liberation was neither joyfu l nor lighthearted.
For most it occurred against a tragic
background o f destruction, slaughter, and
suffering. Just as they felt they were again
becom ing men, that is, responsible, the
sorrows o f men returned: the sorrow o f the

Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isaster, 143
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dispersed or lost family; the universal
suffering all around; their own exhaustion,
which seem ed definitive, past cure; the
problems o f a life to begin all over again amid
the rubble, often alone. N ot "pleasure the son
o f misery," but misery the son o f m i s e r y . * 2
For Levi, the "liberation" m ay not be aptly named i f it intends a
sense o f the end o f the Shoah.
is about a kind o f

Suffering continued, and Levi's essay

suffering that persisted long after the rubble had

been cleared and people had either returned to their
new

one the suffering o f shame.

home or

built a

The moment the SS left Auschwitz,

when the dogs were removed, when the Russians arrived, when one
found one's home again: not one o f these moments marks the end o f
this suffering.

It persists.

The suffering that is the Shoah cannot be transcended, cannot
be appropriated.
and continuity.

It occurs without horizon, outside contextualization
But what does this really mean?

That the Shoah,

while a date in history, a date that can be marked and pointed to, is
also outside history.

Outside history?

Outside the narrative that is

history, the appropriation that is history.

The continuity embodied

in history, the power that is history, cannot appropriate the Shoah.
Suffering is always immemorial, always already past, and thus,
cannot enter into discourse.
Suffering, Blanchot tells us, delivers us "over to another time—
to time as other, as absence and neutrality; precisely to a time that

*2 Levi, “Shame,” from The D row n ed and The

Rosenthal

(N ew

York;

V intage International,

Saved, trans. by Raymond
1989) 70-1.
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can no longer redeem us, that constitutes no recourse.”*^ What would
this redemption be, i f it were possible?

The contextualization o f

suffering, suffering undergone within history.

For Blanchot, this

suffering is marked by its neutrality, the suspension o f beings in
existence—it is affliction.

To history w e have no recourse, since it

cannot account for this suffering.

A ffliction "has lost time altogether.

It is the horror o f a suffering without end, a suffering time can no
longer redeem, that has escaped time and for which there is no
longer recourse; it is irremediable.”*'*

In affliction we are delivered

over to another time, and to history and time as continuum we can
no longer appeal.
Blanchot relates a story about a young man forced to work
directly in the extermination process.

He writes, "[H]e had suffered

the worst, led his fam ily to the crematorium, hanged himself; after
being saved at the last moment—how can one say that: s a v e d ? - - h t
was exempted from contact with dead bodies, but when the SS shot
som eone, he was obliged to hold the victim 's head.”*^ The young
prisoner has indeed suffered.

Blanchot goes on:

When asked how he could bear this, he is
supposed to have answered that he "observed
the comportment o f men before death." 1 w ill
not believe it. A s Lewental, whose notes were
found buried near a crematorium, wrote to us,
"The truth was always more atrocious, more
tragic than what w ill be said about it." Saved
at the last minute, the young man o f whom I
speak was forced to live that last instant
*3 Blanchot, The Infinite C o n versa tio n , 44.
*4 Ibid., 172.
Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isa ster, 82.
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again and each time to live it once more,
frustrated every time o f his own death and
made to exchange it every time for the death
o f all. H is response...was not a response; he
could not respond. What remains for us to
recognize in this account is that when he was
faced w ith an im possible question, he could
find no other alibi than the search for
knowledge, the so-called dignity o f
k n o w led g e....86
For Blanchot, it is unbelievable that the humanistic notion o f the
dignity o f those facing death actually sustained the young prisoner.
In fact, we, too, must question this notion.

If testimony has taught us

anything about death in the camps, it is that life was accorded no
dignity, and death even less.

Those being led to their death usually

did not even know they were going to die (the best example here
being the gas chambers, which were disguised as showers).

But

Blanchot is questioning the survivor's account only by default; the
error, he holds, lies in the question.

The survivor cannot account for

how he survived, how he could bear this horror, and by putting this
"impossible question" to him, we force him to come up with an "alibi."
Blanchot's point is that affliction (the affliction o f suffering, the
affliction o f surviving) can only enter into discourse pedantically,
which is to say, it cannot enter into discourse.

If Nietzsche's work

should teach us anything, Pierre K lossow ski might say, then it is this:
the singular cannot be expressed, for expression belongs to the
gregarious,

to

p ro s titu tio n .^ ^

In order to respond, the survivor must

86 Ibid., 82.
87 Cf. Pierre K lossow ski, N ietzsche and the Vicious C ircle, trans. by Daniel W.
Smith (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1997), esp. chapters 2 and 4
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capitulate, in some sense, to the expectations put upon him.
Discourse, thus, cannot capture affliction, affliction would be its other.
It thus lies outside discourse, outside power, and outside any "why"—
any reasons w e may put forth for it.

It is an-archic, it has no source,

and the history that gives rise to it cannot account for it.
As an historical event, an event with a date, we can approach
the Shoah geographically, perhaps even topologically.

We can

number the camps, list the dead, describe the processes o f
destruction.

We can narrate the events, expose the Nazi bureacracy,

and try and execute the criminals.

But it is never enough.

We

cannot redeem it; history cannot redeem it, because it is an
interruption o f history.

It is the "absolute event," as Blanchot says,

and as such, it is forever other, the other for discourse and the other
for

us. At the end o f his aphorism discussing the young prisoner at

Auschwitz, Blanchot writes, "The w ish o f all, in the camps, the last
wish: know what has happened, do not forget, and at the same time
never w ill you know .”** Or as Charlotte Delbo says, "Try to look.
try and see."

** Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isaster, 82.
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Chapter 3

A. Gascar and the "Season o f the Dead"

The SS waged a war against ceremonialized death; it was, o f
course, one o f their central weapons in the dehumanization process.
Robert Antelm e notes this in The Human Race.

Interned in a non-

Jewish labor camp, Antelme returns from work one day to find two
men carrying the corpse o f a dead Frenchman under the eyes o f an
SS sentry.

"Three men: two guys to carry the dead man, and the

sentry," he writes.

"One more and it would have been a ceremony.

The SS wouldn't have permitted it.
serve as a symbol for us.”*^

The dead mustn't be allowed to

The ceremony would bring the prisoners

together, perhaps stirring sentim ents o f camaraderie and national
pride (m ost o f the prisoners were French): dangers to the
dehumanization process.

"Like our sleeping, like our pissing, our

natural death is tolerated, but no trace o f it may be left behind,
either in memory or in space.

There must be no way o f situating the

place where a dead man lies.”^°

The ceremony must be abolished for

the dehumanization process to succeed.
The cemetery, in the "ordinary" world, functions as a site and a
means for preserving identity.

The dead are "laid to rest" in a

marked grave, strewn with flowers, tended with care.

The funeral is

a means o f weaving the death o f a loved one into the consciousness
o f those left behind.

As H eidegger says, the rituals o f death are

Antelm e, 92.
90 Ibid., 92.
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"tranquillization[s] not only for him who is 'dying' but just as much
for those who 'console' him .”^^

Death, here, is ceremonialized.

not anonymous, but consoling, reassuring.

It is

It is ritualized, and the

ritual em bodies continuity.
In Pierre Gascar's "The Season o f the Dead," Gascar tells the
story o f a group o f French prisoners o f war who tend such a
cemetery.

Caught up in the pretenses o f ceremony in the cemetery,

the prisoners manage to sustain a meaningful existence through the
rituals o f death.

Their cem etery has meandering paths, planted

flowers, and green grass.

Here the dead are not stuffed into

crematoria or thrown into m ass graves, but, rather, are gently laid to
rest.

But the prisoners' fragile world is threatened: deportation

trains pass the camp on a regular basis.

Forced to witness the

destruction o f a people and finally, to face atrocity directly, the quiet,
cerem onialized life o f the prisoners dissolves.
A s the tenders o f the graveyard, the prisoners maintain a
certain distance from the destruction occurring all around them.
In the graveyard w e led that orderly
existence depicted in old paintings and, even
more, in old tapestries and mosaics. A man
sitting beside a clump o f anemones, another
cutting grass with a scythe; water, and
somebody lying flat on his belly drinking, and
som ebody else w ith his eyes turned skyward,
drawing water in a yellow jug....^^

H eidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 298.
92 Pierre Gascar, “The Season o f the Dead,” from A rt from the Ashes, ed. by
Lawrence L. Langer, trans. by Jean Stewart (N ew York: Oxford University
Press, 1995) 433.
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The prisoners maintain a sense o f dwelling where they are in touch
with the natural world and perform meaningful work.

Here the

pastoral sentiments seem a return to an innocent simplicity.

Indeed,

Gascar refers to the graveyard as the "only innocent place" and
describes the prisoners finding there a "sort o f
But their immunity is quickly destroyed.

im m u n ity .

As the SS begin to

arrive in the province in order to deport and kill the local Jews and
dissidents, the prisoners seek refuge increasingly often in the
graveyard.

And then one day, while attempting to dig a trench to

divert water, the narrator strikes a decom posing corpse with his
spade.

Terrified, the prisoners try to bury it again.

One o f them

suggests making a cross o f branches, and they move on to another
location to dig their trench.
rapidly.

But now the corpses are uncovered

First one, then three more are revealed.

The prisoners have

opened a mass grave, and the civilian clothing suggests these dead
were Jews.
"I was overwhelm ed by the somber horror o f it and the truth it
revealed," the narrator says.
This was death—these liquefying m uscles, this
half-eaten eye, those teeth like a dead
sheep's; death, no longer decked with grasses,
no longer ensconced in the coolness o f a vault,
no longer sepulchred in stone, but sprawling
in a bog full o f bones, wrapped in a drowned
man's clothes, with its hair caught in the
earth.94

93

Ib id .,

451.

94

Ib id .,

453
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Here, where death puts on a sacred mask, the horror o f atrocity and
mass murder rears its head, and the sanctity o f the graveyard is
destroyed.

The totality o f the same, embodied in the graveyard, is

here put in question by atrocity.

Ceremonialized death has served

the prisoners as their "innocent place," a kind o f security against the
terrors o f war and the catastrophe being wrought on the Jews.

The

cem etery has becom e for the prisoners a site in the sense Levinas
gives to that term.

"Dwelling," Levinas writes, "is the very mode o f

maintaining oneself..sls the body that...holds i t s e l f up and can....
site, a medium, affords m eans.”^^

confronted with the corpses in

the mass grave, the prisoners can no longer turn away.
is destroyed.

The

All security

This was death, our narrator says, and it is not the

death o f the funeral or wake but mass murder, the corpses relegated
to an unmarked grave.

Overwhelmed, the narrator admits his

inability to cope with the situation.

He is horrified.

"The look...finds," Blanchot says, "in what makes it possible, the
power that neutralizes it...."^6

The subject is overwhelmed.

In the

narrator’s horror, the corpse, the existent, neutralizes the subject, but
it also nullifies the horizon.

The existent, the corpse, puts the entire

meaning o f the cem etery in question.

Whereas the cemetery, as

Gascar points out, reveals an idyllic sense o f communion with nature,
arid undoubtedly with ancestry, the mass grave, covered over,
hidden by the perpetrators, makes no such reference.

"In

Levinas, T o ta lity an d Infinity, 37.
Blanchot, The S pace o f L iteratu re, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln, Nebraska:
University o f Nebraska Press, 1982) 32.
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fascination," Gerald Bruns writes, "everything is withdrawn from the
world.... "97
"Whoever is fascinated doesn't see, properly speaking, what he
sees.

Rather, it touches him in an immediate proximity; it seizes and

ceaselessly draws him close, even though it leaves him absolutely at
a distance."98

The gaze, “properly speaking," would be power, much

like Foucault's panoptic gaze.
neutralized, overwhelmed.
closeness and a distance.

But here the gaze o f power is

It is reduced to proximity; both a
We would like to call it height in Levinas'

sense o f the term, but here the Other is destroyed, mutilated.
horror o f this fascination is rooted in this recognition.

The

As Heidegger

notes, the corpse is not a thing like other things, "This something
which is just-present-at-hand-and-no-m ore is 'more' than a life le s s
material Thing.
its

life ." 9 9

In it we encounter something u n alive, which has lost

The destruction o f the Other, in the fascination atrocity

demands, opens onto the neutral.

"Fascination," Blanchot writes, "is

fundam entally linked to neutral, impersonal presence, to the
indeterminate They, the im m ense, faceless Someone."i®® The
anonymity o f the destroyed Other, found in the mass grave amid the
murdered, opens the subject, which is now no longer a subject, to the
neutral.

As Levinas says, "Horror is somehow a movement which

97 Gerald Bruns, M a u ric e B lan ch ot (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997) 60.
98 Blanchot, The Space o f L iteratu re, 33.
99 Heidegger, Being and Time, 282.
'99 Blanchot, The Space o f L iteratu re, 33
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w ill strip consciousness o f its very subjectivity.”^®!

Anonymous

being, the faceless Someone: the horror o f atrocity.
The encounter opens, thus, onto what Blanchot calls the neutral
and what Levinas calls the il y a, the there is.

Levinas characterizes

the il y a as this "impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable
'consummation' o f being, which murmurs in the depths o f
nothingness itself....

The there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal

form, is 'being in general.’”!®^ But this is no longer being as space or
time, as "receptable for objects, as a means o f access to beings"—it is
not Heidegger's being in which all things participate.!®^

It is, rather,

the murmur o f the being o f the void, that which is there when
nothing is there, the rumble in the night.

It is a "universal absence

[which] is in its turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable
p r e sen ce .”!®*!

b is, as Levinas says, "like the monotonous presence

that bears down on us in insomnia.”!®^
Horror opens us to the il y a.

In horror, as in fascination (for,

as Bruns points out, horror is "...the highest form o f fascination..."),
the subject is neutralized, depersonalized.

"Horror," Levinas tells us,

"is now ise an anxiety about death.”!®® Rather, "...horror turns the
subjectivity o f the subject...inside out.

It is a participation in the

there /5-..in the there is that has 'no exits.”’!®^

Horror neutralizes the

!®! Levinas, “There is:Existence without E xistents,”
from The
Levinas R eader,
ed. by Sean
Hand, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Cambridge,Massachusettes:
B lackw ell Publishers Inc., 1989) 32.
!®2 Ibid., 30.
!®3 Ibid , 32.
!®4 Ibid., 30.
!05 Ibid., 32.
!®6 Ibid., 33.
!®7 Ibid., 33.
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But here subjectivity undergoes yet another transformation;

in the neutralization o f the subject, passivity ensues.

It is for this

reason that w e must stay close to Blanchot's term 'fascination' since it
im plies the sense o f passivity o f the il y a and the neutral.

As

Levinas says, horror does not lull consciousness into unconsciousness,
but throws it into "an im personal vigilance, &p a r tic ip a tio n .
Horror opens the subject to passivity.
It is this horror that Gascar's prisoners try to work against.
After uncovering the mass grave, they attempt to "embroider" over
the corpses, in an effort to dismiss the atrocity.

"On the fringe o f the

war, on the fringe o f the massacres, on the fringe o f Europe,
sheltering behind our prodigious burial-ground, we seem ed like
hollow -eyed gardeners, sitters in the sun, fanatical weeders, busily
working over the dead as over some piece o f embroidery.”i°9

They

attempt to cover over, both literally and figuratively, the murdered
they have uncovered.
But their efforts unravel.

A stonemason in the camp is called

tocarve tombstones for

the German dead buried in the graveyard,

and he is to use stones

stolen from the Jewish cemetery in a nearby

town.

Our narrator confronts him and attempts to convince the

mason not to use the stones, but in the end, he relents.

W hile the

mason rambles on about the stones, the narrator quits listening:
I was no longer listening to him. For the last
few minutes I had been listening to the
rumble o f a train and now it was growing

108 Ibid., 32.
109 Gascar, “The Season o f the Dead,” 460.
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louder. The train was about to emerge round
the tip o f the wood. I could tell, without
waiting for it to roll past before my eyes,
what sort o f freight it carried. Its slow, jolting
sound warned m e o f the other sounds that
would follow although for the moment a
contrary wind delayed them. I should soon
hear the weeping, the cries o f despair. The
silence, no doubt, was due to the wind; but
perhaps, too, those who were being
transported, know ing what fate awaited them,
had deliberately refrained from sending out
their lam entations into that empty, sun-baked
plain, in which the great migrations o f death
had never yet awakened any lasting echo.^i®
The prisoners can no longer turn away from the catastrophe
surrounding them.

The graveyard, work as they might, remains a

mass grave, and the deportation trains continue to rumble past.
terror is

The

everyw here.

In a final effort, the prisoners begin helping a Jewish partisan
named Lebovitch.

At night, Lebovitch hides, paradoxically, in an

unused grave, and the prisoners leave him food and water during the
day.

To save this one man would be to achieve some kind o f return

to the world o f justice and order, hut even this is denied.
is found out, and

Lebovitch

the prisoners simply find his hiding place empty,

his jacket lying in the dirt.
In the end, the narrator frightens even the woman he has been
courting from a distance.

The mass graves, the deportations, and the

murder o f Lebovitch: the narrator tries to escape all this through a
passionate moment with the young woman.

110 Ibid., 463.

However, he frightens

her and she flees.

"I leaned against a tree," he says.

about me a great silence had fallen.
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"Within me and

After a moment I wiped away

m y tears and went back to m y dead.’’^

He has been initiated into

the terror.
The narrator returns to the dead as a member o f a new
community.

No longer pagan or Greek, no longer bound to the

cem etery and to the land, the narrator has been initiated into the
comm unity o f w itnesses.

The deportation trains and the murders

have opened him to a new responsibility; the weight o f Others,
murdered, destroyed, afflicted, overwhelm s him, and in that
overw helm ing binds him.

B.

Exposure and humanism

Gascar's narrator has been exposed to the Shoah's destruction.
In this exposure, horrified fascination strips subjectivity o f its power
and mastery, o f its horizons.

Awash in the destruction and exposed

to the suffering o f others, the narrator cannot transcend the horror;
the deportation trains, mass graves, and murder.

He is exposed to

the il y a, the neutral, and in this exposure he enters a vigilance,
participates in the il y a.

There is no subject o f mastery, but only

this vigilance and participation, marked by witnessing the
annihilation o f others.
To be exposed to the destruction o f the Shoah, as we have said,
is to be exposed to the neutral, the Outside, the il y a.

111 Ibid., 470.

Here, in
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horrified fascination, the subject is powerless; no mastery or
possession here marks subjectivity.
horrifies and fascinates it.

It can no longer transcend what

The horizons have all been nullified.

It is

thus that, in a discussion o f m essianic thought, Blanchot asks the
question: "How is it possible to say: Auschwitz has happened?.
Christian and political m essianism is always a thought o f the end, o f a
"just finish."^ 13

But the interruption o f history, the ultimate suffering

at Auschw itz, precludes this end.

To say that Auschwitz has

happened is to draw a close to the event which cannot be closed.
exposure to the Outside interrupts this ending.

The

It is on these terms,

it seem s, that Blanchot says, "He who has been the contemporary o f
the camps is forever a survivor..
W hich is all to say that, as the moment in history which cannot
be appropriated, the Shoah is, for thought, the other.
interruption o f history in history itself.
appropriated by thought.
again institute power.

It is an

As such, the Shoah cannot be

O nly the neutralization o f alterity can once

Greek thought, pagan thought, is always a

thought o f power, o f assim ilation and appropriation.

As Levinas

says:
If an exterior and foreign being is to
surrender itse lf to intermediaries there must
be produced som ewhere a great "betrayal."
A s far as things are concerned, a surrender is
carried out in their conceptualization. As for
man, it can be obtained by the terror that
brings a free man under the domination o f

112 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isaster, 143.
113 Ibid., 143.
114 Ibid., 143.
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another. For the things the work o f ontology
consists in apprehending the individual
(which alone exists) not in its individuality
but in its generality (o f which alone there is
science). The relation with the other is here
accom plished only through a third term which
I find in m yself. The ideal o f the Socratic
truth thus rests on the essential selfsufficiency o f the same, its identification
in...its egoism . Philosophy is an egology.^s
Thus it is that philosophy is always appropriation and assimilation.
The relation with the other always occurs within the horizon o f being
(Levinas' third term), and as such, is neutralized.

But the Shoah

nullifies all horizons, and thus, ontology, paganism, cannot account
for our relation with it.
Exposed to the Outside, thought can no longer appropriate and
assim ilate, but rather, m erely participates in neutrality.

It is

transformed into vigilance, a vigilance no longer located within an
egology, but dispersed: the nomadic.
nomadic.

The exposed is perpetually

Aharon A ppelfeld has emphasized this point in his work

For Every Sin.

Theo, a survivor o f the camps who is trying to return

home, is constantly confronted by other refugees.

They sit under

trees, smoke cigarettes, play poker, lay on the ground.

When they

m ove, they m ove slow ly, or angrily, though their anger always
subsides quickly.
idleness annoying.

They are adrift.

Theo despises them; he finds their

But he slow ly recognizes his own struggle in

theirs: there is nowhere to go, nowhere to return to.
joins their numbers, the ranks o f the hom eless.

Levinas, T o ta lity

an d Infinity, 44

In the end, he

As his friend tells
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him: "There's no sense seeking something that can never be
a t t a i n e d . T h e r e is no home to return to; the exposed are nomads.
Thus, the exposed belong to this other humanism, this Jewish
humanism, which recalls us to the "exigency o f strangeness.
Gascar's narrator has been exposed to the destruction o f the Shoah,
and as such, has been exposed to the Outside.

He has been initiated

into this other humanism, wherein the exposure puts the subject in
question and the mastery and power o f the pagan dwelling has been
abolished.

This other humanism is a humanism o f exposure and

speech: exposure to the Outside, and speech as the space where
distance is maintained even in address.

The community o f witnesses

is bound by this exposure, by this humanism.

Through the mouth o f

Yukel, a survivor, Edmond Jabes writes, "In a village in central
Europe, the N azis one day buried some o f our brothers alive.
shifted with them for a long time.

The soil

That night, one and the same

rhythm bound Israelites to the w o r l d . T h e witness, too, is bound
to the world through the suffering he has witnessed.

He is thrust, in

his fascinated horror, in his witnessing, into the catastrophe, and he
is now bound by the ceaseless appeal o f Auschwitz.

)
Aharon A ppelfeld, For E very Sin, trans. by Jeffrey M. Green (New York:
Grove Press, 1989) 167-8.
Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 234.
118 Jabes, The Book o f Yukel, 120.

Chapter 4

A.

Interruption

W e have seen that our traditional notions o f subjectivity cannot
account for the experience (if, indeed, we can continue to use this
word) o f the camps.

The suffering o f the victims and the

Muselmanner, and the horrified fascination o f the witness, both open
onto the neutral.

Suffering as an-other time, a time without end and

without recourse, inaugurates the neutral, anonymous space o f the il
y a.

In fascination, the horizons crumble and the witness as

subjectivity dissolves.

In the anonym ity o f the neutral, paganism

can no longer answer to the fundamental relation, the relation to
others and the exterior.

Nomadism is the mode o f the perpetually

exposed, and it defines the community o f survivors and witnesses.
This exposure is fundamentally a stripping o f power.

The

horizon, against which subjectivity can measure, collapses in the face
o f the Shoah.

No longer is the subject whole and identified, no longer

can it proceed from the site o f dwelling.
into the anonymous.

Rather, the subject dissolves

Here, in the nam eless night, in the undeniable

presence o f this absence, there is only vigilance and passivity, the
silent ruins o f the site.
But the question remains: how do we encounter the Shoah?
Ontology, philosophy, is power.
alterity.

It is the power to neutralize

Being provides measure, the horizon against which all

existents are measured.

It is only herein that existents can take on
49
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their familiarity, for here the existent is subsumed beneath a general
theme: being.

Being, in this sense, not only provides horizon, but is

the horizon itself.

It is the "against-which" that allows

comprehension, the horizon that allows things to be understood in
their generality.

O ntology is power.

For Levinas, this power is put in question by the encounter
with the Other.
in question.

In the face I encounter alterity and, as such, am put

I must respond, and as Blanchot points out, 1 must

respond either in speech (thus entering into relation with the infinite
w hile maintaining that absolute alterity) or through mortal violence
(destroying that alterity which puts my power in question).
encounter with the Other the horizon o f being is nullified.

In the
Thus, the

power o f ontology is interrupted by alterity, by this alterity that, in
encounter, cannot be reduced without some kind o f response.
Blanchot sees a similar encounter in testimony.

He writes,

"...A uschw itz...im poses, through testim ony, the indefeasible duty not
to forget....”**^
Other.

Testimony, as we have seen, is this encounter with the

Levi's curse demands we face this other man who is fighting

for scraps in the mud.

Delbo's narratives demand that we recognize

(at the very least, recognize) that, i f w e believe w e can comprehend
her narratives, w e are deceiving ourselves.

Here, in both instances,

the power o f subjectivity is put in question, and not only subjective
power, but power itself.
neutralizing it.

Thought cannot think the other except by

W hen Levinas tells us that ontology can only

understand things in their generality, that is, scientifically, we must

Blanchot, “Do Not Forget,” 247.
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understand by this that ontology can only understand things within
the measure o f comprehension and totality: precisely what Levi and
Delbo especially deny in relation to the Shoah.

What testimony

denies is that power (the power o f subjectivity or the power o f
philosophy, etc.) can measure it.
After all, what is thought called upon to think here?
and names, not locations and numbers.

Not dates

Rather, thought is here called

upon to think the neutral, to think fascination and to think suffering.
Thought, philosophy, is here exposed, and as such, deposed.
cannotcontain the neutral, but, in turn,
horrified by it.

can only be fascinated

History cannot contain the interruption

It
or

o f history

since the interruption exceeds history's power to reduce it.
Philosophy cannot contain the Shoah, because the Shoah will always
be the denial o f power;
im m ediacy o f suffering,

because the Shoah, as we have said, is the
and philosophy is always the mediated;

because the Shoah is the event without horizon, and philosophy is
always the horizon.
A fragment o f Blanchot's might be useful here.

He writes:

The correct criticism o f the System does not
consist (as is m ost often, complacently,
supposed) in finding fault with it, or in
interpreting it in sufficien tly (which even
H eidegger som etim es does), but rather in
rendering it invincible, invulnerable to
criticism or, as they say, inevitable. Then,
since nothing escapes it because o f its
omnipresent unity and the perfect cohesion o f
everything, there remains no place for
fragmentary writing unless it come into focus
as the im possible necessary: as that which is
written in the tim e outside time, in the sheer
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suspense which without restraint breaks the
seal o f unity by, precisely, not breaking it, but
by leaving it aside without this abandon's
ever being able to be known. It is thus,
inasmuch as it separates itse lf from the
m anifest, that fragmentary writing does not
belong to the One.^^o
Philosophy, the System, the concept, is, for Blanchot, occupational;
they are totalities that dictate certain understandings.

Here he is

very close to G illes D eleuze and Felix Guattari when they write, "The
concept is the contour, the configuration, the constellation o f an event
to com e....

The task o f philosophy when it creates concepts...is always

to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event
from things and

b e i n g s . . . . ” ^21

Philosophy is not only, as Levinas says,

an egology, but it is also totalitarian in its power.

It occupies thought

much like an army occupies a conquered land .^22

120 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isaster, 61.

G illes Deleuze and F elix Guattari, What Is P hilosoph y?, trans. by Hugh
Tom linson and Graham Burchell (N ew York; Columbia University Press, 1994)
3 2 -3
122 Contemporary continental thought can be
characterized in one sense in
the way M ichel Foucault characterizes D eleuze and Guattari's A n ti-O e d ip u s in
his preface to that work: as attempting to find a way o f “living counter to all
form s o f fascism , whether already present or im pending....” This is certainly
true o f L evinas’ work but is especially true o f B lanchot’s.
As participants in
the conversation o f philosophy, thinkers like D eleuze and Blanchot (as I have
indicated earlier) have sought to indicate w here philosophy becom es fascist as
w ell: in the desire for om nipresent unity, w herein philosophy and the
concepts it generates define e v e r y th in g , w ithout leaving “room ” for question.
For Blanchot, the matter seem s to lie, as it does so often for Levinas, in the
neutralization o f alterity: philosophy, in a sense, is a way o f dealing with
difference that always reassures the pow erful.
This sim ilarity (the desire to
com bat fascism w ithout becom ing fascist) is interesting to note, especially
given the vast differences between projects lik e that o f D eleuze and Guattari,
on the one hand, and that o f Blanchot, on the other.
Cf. M ichel Foucault,
preface, A n ti- O e d ip u s , by G illes D eleuze and F elix Guattari, trans. by Robert
Hurley, Mark Seem , and H elen R. Lane (M inneapolis: University o f Minnesota
Press, 1983) xiii.
121
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The fragment, for Blanchot, breaks with this totalitarianism.
Totalitarianism is not fought by replacing the old regime with a new
one, but rather by interruption.

He writes:

[AJffirm the b r e a k . . break? The break
w ith the powers that be, hence with the
notion o f power, hence everywhere that
pow er predominates.
This obviously applies
to the University, to the idea o f knowledge, to
the language relations to be found in teaching,
in leading, perhaps to all language, etc., but
applies even more to our own conception o f
opposition to the powers that be, each time
such opposition constitutes itse lf to become a
party in power.*23
And further:
This theoretical undertaking obviously does
not entail drawing up a programme or a
platform, but rather, independent o f any
programmatic project, indeed o f any project,
m aintaining a refusal that is an affirmation,
bringing out or maintaining an affirmation
that does not come to any arrangements, but
rather undoes arrangements, including its
own, since it is in relation with dis
arrangement or disarray or else the nonstructurable.*24
The fragment functions in Blanchot's work as this kind o f
interruption o f the totality o f the System; where the System occupies
totally, the fragment appears and is difference.

For Blanchot, there is

only the affirm ation o f disturbance and interruption.
The irruption o f difference within the totality (interruption),
thus puts the totality in question without destroying or replacing it.
123 Blanchot, “Disorderly W ords,” 200.
124 Ibid., 201.
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The interruption cannot be appropriated; it is a refusal, a nomadic
irruption.

And not only does the Jew serve as this refusal for the

anti-Sem ite and the Nazi regim e, but the Shoah is this refusal within
the totality o f history and the discourse o f philosophy.

Suffering,

horror, the neutral; these escape the positivity o f the concept.

As the

interruption o f history, ' as the without-end, Auschwitz and the Shoah
cannot be conceptualized—they always escape the concept.
Here Blanchot's notion o f "un-knowledge" proves helpful.

He

writes, "Un-knowledge is not a lack o f knowledge; it is not even
know ledge o f the lack but rather that which is hidden by knowledge
and ignorance alike: the neutral, the
"hides" the neutral, covers it over.
assim ilates.

u n - m a n i f e s t . ” ^26

Knowledge

It always appropriates and

Un-knowledge, then, would be a relation that does not

assim ilate, that does not appropriate and reduce.

Rather, it

participates: it sustains a relation with alterity that does not do
mortal violence.
alterity.

It affirms alterity and affirms interruption in its

"Enough o f theory which w ields and organizes knowledge,"

he writes. 127
un-knowledge.

Rather, he wants to inaugurate a new knowledge, an
"When know ledge is no longer a knowledge o f truth,

it is then that knowledge starts: a knowledge that bums thought, like
know ledge o f infinite patience.” 12 »

This un-knowledge is the

125 In no way do I mean to im ply here that the Shoah, as catastrophic event,
should be affirmed, for exam ple, in lieu o f som e theoretical or political end.
Rather, what must be recognized, and this sense, affirmed, is difference, the
difference the Shoah presents w ithin history.
Not to recognize this would be
to set the entire apparatus o f pow er back in motion, thus subsuming this
m oment within the totality o f discourse.
126 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isa ster, 63.
127 Ibid., 43.
128 Ibid., 43.
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participation in the neutral, the relation with alterity that does not,
as Greek or pagan thought does, reduce, assimilate, and appropriate.
W hich is to say that the Shoah remains for thought, for Greek
thought and for ontology, the other.

When Blanchot writes,

"...A uschw itz...im poses, through testim ony, the indefeasible duty not
to forget: remember, beware o f forgetfulness and yet, in that faithful
m em ory, never w ill you know," he circumscribes this interruption.*^9
D o not forget: the interruption, the break with the whole, the
exigen cy o f alterity initiates us into "an interminable anamnesis.
N evertheless, never w ill w e know.

Thus, when Blanchot asks, in The

Writing o f the D isaster, "How can thought be made the keeper o f the
holocaust where all was lost, including guardian thought?," we must
answer (with him, I think) that thought cannot be made this
k e e p e r .131
assimilated.

The interruption cannot be appropriated, cannot be
The thought o f power and the site, Greek and pagan

thought, cannot withstand the exigency o f the Shoah.

Thus, we must

answer Blanchot's question: thought cannot be the keeper o f the
Shoah, i f w e mean by thought the power to understand, to grasp and
to redeem.

Only a thought which could sustain itself outside power

and occupation could be made the keeper o f the Shoah.
Blanchot's notion o f Jewish humanism pushes toward this other
relation that interruption inaugurates.

Its nomadism releases

thought from its ties to the site and dwelling, the sources o f power.
It is a relation with otherness that affirms alterity, that does not flee

129 Blanchot, “Do Not Forget,” 247-8.
130 Ibid., 249
131 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isa ster, 47.
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before it.

Here there is a relation with Others as Others, with

exteriority.

The question is: in what sense can we say this other

humanism is the k e e p e r o f the Shoah?
Insofar as this humanism does not reduce difference or
assim ilate the Other, insofar as it does not neutralize alterity, it
sustains the mode o f relation that the Shoah demands.
writes, "Try to look.

When Delbo

Just try and see," she attempts to secure the

alterity o f her narrative, to deny the reader's ability to appropriate
it.‘32

She demands that we encounter her narrated experience

without appropriating it, without w eaving the discontinuous into the
continuous.

This humanism would speak to this end.

In this relation,

what is proximal nevertheless remains distant; its relation is one o f
sustaining difference.

As Blanchot says, in this relation "[djistance is

not abolished, it is not even diminished; on the contrary, it is
maintained, preserved in its purity....”‘33
In this other humanism there is no mediation introduced into
the relation.

In Heideggerian ontology, neutralization is wrought a

priori-, everything occurs in being.

But for Jewish humanism, the

only landscape is that o f speech, the speech that does not reduce
difference but rather sustains it: m y addressing the Other.

In the

address no third term is introduced; there is only the address o f one
to the other, the speech o f proximity that does not reduce.
Blanchot says, "Judaism is the sole thought that does not

‘32 Delbo, None o f Us Will Return, 84.
‘33 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 233
‘34 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isaster, 63.

As
m e d i a t e . ” ‘ 34

57
But the question o f keeping the Shoah here is revealed as a
fruitless one.
and pagans?

When we ask about keeping, are we not still Greeks
Do we not still seek power?

Ultimately, yes, we do.

The interrogations o f philosophy, power, subjectivity, etc., that we
have engaged in the thought o f Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice
Blanchot reveal, i f nothing else, one fundamental insight: knowledge
is a power relation.

For ontology, and for philosophy and

subjectivity, know ledge is the neutralization o f alterity through
mediation.

Power pervades philosophy and thought.

And i f we ask

for a thought that could keep the Shoah, whatever that might mean,
then we are asking for a thought that could encompass it, embrace it,
and make o f it a thing to be understood.
And this is the heart o f this other humanism: it is a thought of
relation, i f it is a thought at all.

It is the mode o f encounter when the

power that drives philosophy and subjectivity is stripped.

It is not

an encompassing thought, but a m ode o f encounter, a mode o f
encountering the unknown, the foreign, and the strange.
gather, does not render, and does not appropriate

It does not

It is the name o f

135 Philosophy must, in this sense, becom e the question o f philosophy, which
also m eans that philosophy must becom e the question o f power.
It is thus, it
seem s, that Blanchot occupies that strange space between theory and
literature, between the philosopher and the writer.
It is as though Blanchot
attempts to sustain a questioning outside the bounds o f philosophy as
organizational discourse.
His notion o f nomadism would "fit" this "model."
Nom adism engages totalities from outside without setting itse lf up as the new
apparatus o f power.
Philosophy must begin to heed this call (and it is also the
call, I think, o f D eleuze and Guattari).
Contemporary continental theory has
done just this: from N ietzsche to H eidegger, and from H eidegger to Derrida,
B lanchot, L evinas, D eleu ze, etc., the history o f tw entieth-century continental
theory can be read as the questioning o f the philosophy o f the subject, and,
thus,
the questioning o f philosophy itself.
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the relation between two existents when they find them selves face
to face and disoriented, absolutely disoriented.
Thus, this other humanism is not the keeper o f the Shoah.
Rather, it is the w ay in which w e must encounter the Shoah.

Levi's

curse does not demand our understanding, but only our encountering
o f this other.

The Shoah and its testimony w ill always be the

interruption o f the continuous, the interruption o f discourse.
there is no keeper o f the Shoah, for it escapes all bounds.

Thus,

We are left

only with our responsibility.

B.

Our Position

Our relation with the Shoah, with testimony, is defined by
encounter, not knowledge.

If we return to Levi's curse, we must

remember that he calls us forth to encounter the Other, to "consider
i f this is a man" who fights for scraps o f bread, who dies because o f a
yes or a no.

We must face this Other, Levi holds, and we sense in this

our responsibility as the inheritors o f history.

The Other, dying,

destroyed, no longer even really an identity, opens the exigency o f
the Shoah, and we must, as Levinas tells us, respond.

Our

responsibility is born o f this encounter.
This responsibility is bom out o f encounter, out o f the
encounter wherein the Other strips m e o f my power to remain
m yself.

In the "moment" when power is arrested, in the time o f the

encounter which is anterior to being and to time (the time o f
encountering the face or the horrible), responsibility is bora.

And it
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is the gravest o f responsibilities: not that responsibility o f duties or
deeds, but the responsibility o f one human being to another, called
out, naked, stripped o f all power.

And returned to oneself, one's

unique self, only in the bound form o f the hostage.

If I hear the

Other, I am bound to the Other.
This responsibility, Levinas tells us, is:
A responsibility stemming from a time before
m y freedom —before m y beginning, before
any present. A fraternity existing in extreme
separation.... R esponsibility for my neighbor
dates from before m y freedom in an
im m em orial past, an unrepresentable past
that was never present and is more ancient
than consciousness of... A responsibility for
m y neighbor, for the other man, for the
stranger or sojourner, to which nothing in the
rigorously ontological order binds m e—
nothing in the order o f the thing, o f the
something, o f number or causality.
It is the responsibility o f a h o s t a g e . . . 1^6
This responsibility is bom o f encounter, the very encounter Levi
demands in his curse.

But here Levinas draws us toward Blanchot's

notion o f this other humanism more than ever, for here, I am bound
com pletely to the Other, beyond any ordered reality and anterior to
any commitments.
address, in his face.

The Other has here bound me to him, in his very
This is not a demand that the ordered world can

answer to, a demand like Kant's
rational beings must adhere.

Categorical Imperative, to which all

No; this demand is made upon me and

me only, drawing me out to account for it.

As Levinas says, "In the

136 Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” from The Levinas R eader, ed. by Sean
Hand, trans. by Sean Hand and M ichael Tem ple, 84
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face o f the other man I am inescapably responsible and consequently
the unique and chosen one [m y em phasis].”^37 / must respond; / a m
responsible.

I am, in a very

important sense,

Thus, in the encounter, T
and identity.
transfiguration.

a hostage.

am dissolved, stripped o f m y power

But I am also returned, but this return has its own
Blanchot tells us:

The hostage is the nonconsenting, the
unchosen guarantee o f a promise he hasn't
made, the irreplaceable one who is not in his
own place. It is through the other that I am
the same, through the other that I am myself:
it is through the other who has always
withdrawn me from m yself. The Other, if he
calls upon me, calls upon someone who is not
I: the first come or least o f men; by no means
the unique being I would like to be. It is thus
that he assigns me to passivity..
The return is not the return to the stable identity o f the same as "I
would like to be."

Rather, it is as the hostage, the bound.

unique, but I am no longer I: I

I am

am the bound one; the one on whom

responsibility for the Other lies. For Blanchot, the encounter

with the

Other, this responsibility, is a kind o f transfiguration.
Thus, in this other humanism we are bound to the Other, not by
an order in the world, but by this responsibility.

The encounter with

the Other, which strips subjectivity o f all power and identity, calls
me out in my responsibility.
ontological orders.

I am bound to the Other "prior to" all

Thus, responsibility opens in the "moment" when

power is arrested, in the m oment when subjectivity no longer rules.

137 Ibid., 84.
138 Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isa ster, 18.
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It is this relation, our relation with the Other, to which Blanchot holds
paganism and ontology does not hold the "key.”*39
N evertheless, as Blanchot reminds us at the end o f his essay on
being Jewish, human power, the power o f subjectivity, is "capable o f
any th in g.

He writes:
Anti-Semitism , in this sense, is in no way
accidental; it gives a figure to the repulsion
inspired by the Other, the uneasiness before
what comes from afar and elsewhere: the
need to kill the Other, that is, to submit to the
all-pow erfulness o f death what cannot be
measured in terms o f power.i^i

For both Blanchot and Levinas, the encounter with the Other
demands responding, whether that response be speech or mortal
v io le n c e .

Mortal violence, as Levinas has indicated, is simply an

inverse o f speech, the hateful r e s p o n s e . T h e Other demands my
response, and anti-Semitism is the response that gives body to the
"repulsion" o f being stripped o f all identity and power.
Nietzschean term, it is reaction p a r excellence.

To use a

Human power is

capable o f anything because it can refuse, through mortal violence,
even the exigency o f the Other.

But this refusal is nonetheless a

turning toward the exigency o f the Other.

As Blanchot says, "The

anti-Semite, at grips with the infinite, thus commits him self to a
lim itless m ovem ent o f refusal."!'*^

139 Blanchot, “The
140 Ibid., 232.
141 Ibid., 234-5.
142 Levinas, E thics
D uquesne U niversity
143 B lanchot, “The

Indestructible,” 232.

an d Infinity, trans. by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh:
Press, 1985) 89.
Indestructible,” 235.
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In the encounter with testimony, w ith Levi's curse and Delbo's
exteriorized narratives, w e are thus thrust into this relation with the
Other.

The question centers around what our relation with the Shoah

must be.

A s the "absolute event" o f history, to use Blanchot's terms,

in what sense can we enter into relation with the Shoah?
encounter it as nomads and hostages.

We must

Here is the event which cannot

be reduced to the historical circumstances that gave rise to it.
History, the thematization and contextualization o f events, would
have us reduce the Shoah to Hitler's anti-Semitism, Eichmann's
bureacratic efficacy, the failure o f enlightenment values, etc.

But

each contextualization only occults

The

the horror o f the neutral.

Shoah exceeds all bounds.
Note the visage o f the Muselmann.

Blanchot writes, "The

suffering o f our time: 'A w asted man, bent head, bowed shoulders,
unthinking,

gaze extinguished'

Levi, too, writes:

...if 1 could enclose all the evil o f our time in
one image, 1 would choose this image which is
familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head
dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face
and in whose eyes not a trace o f thought is to
be seen.145
Levi does not choose the image o f the SS man, truncheon in hand
with a bloodthirsty dog beside him, as his image o f evil.
chooses the visage o f the Muselmann, destroyed, broken.

Blanchot, The W riting o f the D isaster, 81.
145 Levi, S u rv iva l in A u schw itz, 90.

Rather, he
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extinguished but still alive.

The destruction exceeds even the Nazis'

power, w hile nevertheless arising from the N azi terror.
And this is the paradox o f the Shoah, it seems.
o f history that cannot be reduced to history.

It is the event

It is the break with all

forms o f totality: the narrative o f history, the power o f subjectivity,
and even the power o f the totalitarian State.

The suffering o f those

in the camps, the Shoah itself, can only be circumscribed.
can only be circumscribed.

The break

But history and subjectivity, philosophy

and the tyranny o f the State can always appropriate and neutralize
alterity.

Human power is capable o f anything.

But this appropriation is still a relation with the infinite; it is
the violent response, the insistence on paganism and the power o f
the site.

But it does not answer to the demand o f the Other; it cannot

answer to this demand.

For in this demand I am stripped o f my

identity and bound to the Other fundamentally.

The refusal o f this

demand can be realized only violently: in the mortal violence o f
murder or in the neutralizing violence o f ontology.
The encounter w ith the Other, by thrusting me into the
anonymous, exiles m e from the site.
bound to the Other, as a hostage.
space and it binds me.

And in this nomadic space 1 am
My responsibility opens in this

The body o f this responsibility is speech, the

speech wherein "[djistance is not abolished, it is not even diminished;
on the contrary, it is m a i n t a i n e d . . . . j j j this sense, speech affirms
distance, affirms the break—it does not reduce.

Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 233.

The unknown does
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not becom e known, but becom es that which I must bear, as that
which binds me.

The Shoah thus binds the generations which follow.

M y responsibility for the Shoah is not that o f a doer in relation
to a deed.

It is a moral responsibility, but not in this strict sense.

Rather, it is the responsibility which "precedes," in an immemorial
past, any kind o f order or ethics.

It is the burning immediacy o f the

Other's proxim ity, which is nevertheless defined by distance.

It is

the obliteration o f the horizon, whether that horizon be history,
philosophy, subjectivity; it nullifies our power to envelop and
comprehend and narrate and appropriate.

It is the break with

totality, w hile always threatened by totalities.
power dissolves.

And in that break all

A s the inheritors o f history, as the generations that

follow catastrophe, w e are bound to this break, to this cry.

In a footnote Blanchot writes o f speech:
With the experience that he draws from
h im self and from his learning, Gerschom
Scholem has said, speaking o f the relations
between the Germans and the Jews: "The
abyss opened between us by these events
cannot be measured...For, in truth, it is
im possible to realize com pletely what
happened.
Its incom prehensible nature has
to do with the very essence o f the
phenomenon: it is im possible fully to
understand it, that is to say, integrate it into
our consciousness."
Im possible, therefore, to
forget it, im possible to remember it. A lso
im possible, in speaking about it, to speak of
it—and finally, as there is nothing but this
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incom prehensible event to say, it is speech
alone that must bear it without saying it.i^"^
We must encounter this event, and we cannot comprehend it.

Speech

must bear the Shoah without saying it, as if every homeland were
destroyed, every power abolished, and every horizon toppled.

147 Ibid., 243.

